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We focus on two international aspects of the Great Depression—financial crises and international
trade— and try to discern lessons for the current economic crisis.  Both downturns featured global
banking crises which were generated by boom-slump macroeconomic cycles.   During both crises,
world trade collapsed faster than world incomes and the trade decline was highly synchronized across
countries. In the Depression, income losses and rises in trade barriers explain trade’s collapse. Due
to vertical specialization and more intense trade in durables, today’s trade collapse is due to uncertainty
and small shocks to trade costs hitting international supply chains. So far, the global economy has
avoided the global trade wars and banking collapses of the Depression perhaps due to improved policy.
Even so, the global economy remains susceptible to large shocks due to financial innovation and technological
















I.  INTRODUCTION 
  Despite the severe stagnation that has gripped the world’s economy in the aftermath 
of the Subprime Crisis, the Great Depression remains, without question, the longest, 
deepest, and broadest economic contraction that the industrialized world has ever known.  
In all seventeen of the countries for which data are presented in Figure 1, real GDP per 
capita growth during 1930-33 was far slower than during the pre-World War I period 
(1871-1913), the interwar period as a whole (1919-39), the early post-World War II period 
(1948-73), and the later post-World War II period (1974-2006).  More than three quarters 
of these countries experienced negative economic growth.  Unemployment rates of above 
20 percent were common (Table 1).  Banking and financial crises were widespread (Table 
2). Trade also declined substantially (Figure 3): exports in 27 leading countries declined by 
over 50% between 1929 and 1932 while real GDP in these same countries fell some 15% 
during those same years. Consequently the share of world exports in world GDP in 1933 
was a little more than half the size of that in 1929.  
  Prior to the 1980s, academic research on the Great Depression concentrated 
disproportionately on the United States (Kindleberger, 1973 is a prominent exception), 
focusing in particular on whether the downturn was the result of monetary forces 
(Friedman and Schwartz, 1963) or a decline in some component of real expenditure (e.g., 
Temin, 1976).  Starting in the 1980s, a growing literature, including Choudhuri and Kochin 
(1980), Eichengreen and Sachs (1985), Temin (1989), Bernanke and James (1991), 
Eichengreen (1992a), and James (2001), began to take a more global perspective 
(Bernanke, 1995, Eichengreen, 2004).  And although the argument that the Great 
Depression originated in—and emanated from--the United States is still powerful (Romer,  
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1993), the importance of international factors in driving the Great Depression is better 
established than ever. 
  In this article, we focus on two aspects of the Great Depression which had 
important international dimensions: banking crises and international trade.  We conclude 
with a comparison between the Great Depression and today’s global downturn and some 
observations on the path of economic policy and our understanding of how the global 
economy is evolving. 
    
II. BANKING CRISES 
  Financial crises were a defining characteristic of the Great Depression, as they have 
been of the Great Recession.  Of course, the term “financial crisis” encompasses many 
different classes of episodes, including banking crises, currency crises, debt defaults, and 
securities market crises, to name but a few (Kindleberger, 1978: 21–2).  We concentrate on 
banking, rather than currency or securities market crises for two reasons.  First, given that 
the international gold standard regime collapsed during the 1930s, virtually every country 
that had been on the gold standard experienced some sort of currency crisis.  All seventeen 
countries catalogued by Bordo et al. (2001: web appendix) underwent at least one currency 
crisis during 1930-36.  Second, although a number of stock market crashes took place 
during the Great Depression, the scholarly consensus is that, with the possible exception of 
the October 1929 crash on Wall Street (Romer, 1990), crises in securities markets were not 
important in bringing about the Great Depression (Kindleberger, 1973: 108 and 
Eichengreen, 1992b), but were most often a consequence of the collapse of the banking and 
non-financial sectors of the economy.    
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  By contrast, banking crises play a central role in many analyses of the causes of the 
Great Depression (e.g., Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, Temin, 1976, Bernanke, 1983).  
Bernanke and James (1991), for example, find that countries that experienced banking 
crises had significantly worse depressions than those that did not.  Table 2 classifies 26--
primarily European, but including Canada, Japan, and the United States--countries by 
whether or not they had banking crises during the Great Depression.   
  Although there is compelling evidence that banking crises played an important role 
in the Great Depression, there is no consensus on the channel through which the crises 
affected real economic activity.  Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Cagan (1965) argue 
that banking crises increased the public’s desired currency-to-deposit ratio, as depositors 
strove to convert deposits into cash, which reduced the money supply and led to a decrease 
in prices and output.  Fisher (1932, 1933), Minsky (1982), and Kindleberger (1978) view 
banking crises as a crucial link in the debt-deflation process: just as banks extended credit 
to ever more marginal borrowers during the preceding economic expansion, the subsequent 
downturn left these marginal borrowers unable to repay their debts, which led to a decline 
in prices and an increasing number of debt defaults.  Bernanke (1983) emphasizes the role 
of banks in providing intermediation services, and argues that bank failures during the 
Depression raised the cost of credit intermediation and worsened the economic downturn.  
Eichengreen (1992a) and Temin (1993) highlight the role that banking crises played in the 
international spread of the Great Depression. 
  Financial crises have long transcended regional and national boundaries.  Friedman 
and Schwartz (1963) describe American banking crises as spreading through a “contagion 
of fear,” as the failure of weak banks led to panic withdrawals by depositors in more sound 
banks, causing them to fail too.   Kindleberger (1978: 118)  describes their international  
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transmission as taking place through a variety of channels: “…psychological infection, 
rising and falling prices of commodities and securities, short-term capital movements, 
interest rates, the rise and fall of world commodity inventories.”  He presents a table (p. 
127) showing the total number of commercial and financial failures in different cities on a 
monthly basis, nicely illustrating the geographic spread of a crisis outward from London, to 
the rest of Britain, to British colonies, and to continental and American destinations 
following the initial crisis August 1847.  The international dimension of banking crises 
became, if anything, more important during the subsequent crises during the decades of the 
1870s, 1890s, and 1900s (Grossman, 2010).   
  The interwar period saw two distinct waves of banking crises, both of which were 
initiated by cyclical downturns.  The first took place during the early 1920s and affected 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.  Although 
international linkages did contribute to the spread of these crises, they were primarily the 
result of the collapse of post-World War I booms that occurred in many countries 
(Grossman, 2010).  Further, because virtually no country had yet restored the gold 
standard, the economic downturn of the early 1920s was relatively short-lived 
(Eichengreen, 1992a: 100). 
  The second wave of banking crises was initiated by a cyclical downturn that began 
in 1929-30.  Crises were centered both in the United States, which experienced banking 
crises in October 1930, March 1931, and March 1933, and in Europe, where banking crises 
began in earnest in 1931 with the May collapse of Austria’s Credit-Anstalt.  The Credit-
Anstalt had been the largest bank in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and was by far the 
dominant bank in post-World War I Austria: following its absorption of the failing 
Bodencreditanstalt in 1929, it held 70 percent of total Austrian banking assets.  The bank  
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had been overextended for some time and the economic downturn that began in 1929-30 
led to losses on the loan portfolio that exceeded the bank’s capital (Eichengreen, 1992a: 
264ff. and Schubert, 1991).  
  Revelations about the precarious state of the Credit-Anstalt—it was considered “too 
big to fail” and was, in fact, rescued by the government and the Austrian National Bank--
led to bank runs in Poland and Hungary, the effective suspension of the Austrian gold 
standard, and heightened concerns about Germany, which also had large outstanding short-
term foreign debts.  The failure of a large German textile company, the Norddeutsche 
Wollkämmerei und Kammgarnspinnerei (Nordwolle), in June led to a run on, and the 
collapse of, the Darmstädter und Nationalbank (Danat-Bank) in July, which led to capital 
flight, suspension of the gold standard, and a further spread of banking crises, particularly 
to banks with German connections in eastern and central Europe and in the Middle East.  
Britain, which had run persistent balance of payments deficits for several years, now found 
itself under additional pressure, as the suspensions in Germany and Austria and the 
freezing of British credit on the continent, called the British gold standard into question.  
The mounting pressure on the pound forced Britain to leave the gold standard in September 
1931 (Eichengreen and Jeanne, 2000), which led to further banking crises. 
  The banking crises of the interwar period—not to mention those of the more recent 
sub-prime crisis--were very much in the mold of the “boom-bust” crises described by 
Fisher (1932, 1933), Minsky (1982), and Kindleberger (1978): rapid economic expansion, 
accompanied by increasing indebtedness, resulting in heightened financial fragility which 
leads to crises when the economic boom collapses.  The collapse of the post-World War I 
investment boom throughout Europe and the end of the roaring 20’s investment boom in  
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the United States, as well as the collapse of the sub-prime mortgage boom more recently 
each led to banking crises. 
  We can assess a variety of factors which might have enabled—or prevented—
banking crises during the Great Depression by comparing the experiences of countries that 
experienced crises with those that did not (Table 2).  These include the extent of branching, 
bank size, banking concentration, the amplitude of the macroeconomic cycle, and 
regulatory differences (Grossman 1994). 
  Banking systems where banks were, on average, more extensively branched 
typically survived the Depression better than those which were characterized by 
unbranched (i.e., unit) banks.  Extensively branched banks should be less likely to fail than 
unit banks for three reasons.  First, banks with an extensive branch system are likely to 
have a more diversified loan portfolio than unit banks, which make loans in one area only. 
Second, branched banks may have a more diversified deposit base and therefore may be 
less likely to fail due to purely local deposit runs.  Finally, a branch system provides 
seasonal diversification, easing the stringency in money centers caused by the flow of 
funds to agricultural areas at harvest time. 
Banking systems characterized by larger banks were also less prone to crises than those 
characterized by smaller banks.  Large banks might be less prone to failure than smaller 
institutions because they are better able to diversify their loan and investment portfolios and 
thereby reduce the risk from any one nonperforming component.  Additionally, if leading non-
financial firms require larger loans-which small banks do not have the resources to provide-and 
are less likely to default than small firms, then the banks that make these loans may incur 
smaller loan losses.   Finally, banks with substantial resources may be in a better position to 
acquire banks that are on the verge of failure and thus help to stabilize the system.  
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 Banking systems that were characterized by a high degree of concentration were also 
more stable than those that were not.  High concentration might increase stability if it reflects 
the existence of barriers to entry, suggesting that more concentrated banks will be more 
profitable and, hence, better able to stave off failure during a period of crisis.  Further, the 
existence of a small number of banks suggests that cooperation, such as pooling reserves in 
times of crisis, will be more feasible. Although formal banking regulation did not account for 
important differences in financial stability during the Great Depression, having a smaller 
number of institutions may have made it easier for government, central bank, and other 
authorities to exert informal supervision over the banking system.  Because bank branching, 
size, and concentration are typically highly correlated, it is difficult to determine which of these 
attributes was most responsible for banking stability. 
Banking systems which had been purged of many of their weak banks by a crisis 
earlier in the interwar period also typically survived the Great Depression better than those 
that were not.  For example, the banking systems of both the Netherlands and Sweden 
suffered crises during the post-World War I period, but were relatively stable during the 
1930s, perhaps because many of the weaker banks had already exited. 
Finally, economies in general--and banking systems in particular—in countries 
which abandoned the gold standard promptly typically fared better than those in countries 
that clung to the gold standard.  Decoupling from gold was liberating for countries that did 
so, permitting them to undertake more expansionary monetary policy.  The benefits of early 
devaluation are illustrated in Figure 2, which replicates a figure presented by Eichengreen 
and Sachs (1985: 936).  The horizontal axis presents a measure of exchange rates in 1935 
relative to 1929 levels.  France did not devalue the franc until 1936, so its value in 1935 
was equal to that in 1929; by contrast, the currencies of the Scandinavian countries and  
  9
Britain had fallen by 40 percent or more from their 1929 values.  The vertical axis presents 
an index of industrial production in a similar manner.  The industrial production indices in 
Finland, Sweden, and Denmark in 1935 were more than 120 percent of their 1929 levels; 
those of France and Belgium were just over 70 percent of their 1929 values.  The pattern, 
illustrated by the trend line, is clear: countries that experienced more substantial 
depreciations exhibited greater industrial recovery (Belgium is an outlier because it 
devalued during 1935 and the positive effects of currency depreciation on industrial 
production were not felt until later).   Greater depreciation was also associated with 
increased export volume, greater incentive to invest (Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985), and a 
reduced likelihood of enduring a banking crisis (Grossman, 1994).   
Banking crises contributed crucially to the length, depth, and spread of the Great 
Depression.  The historical record suggests that banking systems characterized by more 
extensively branched, larger, and more concentrated firms fared better than those that were 
not.  The record also suggests that “history mattered”: banking systems that had undergone 
crises during the collapse of the post-World War I boom of the early 1920s often shed their 
weakest members and emerged more resilient in the face of the economic downturn of the 
Great Depression.  Finally, the experience highlights the important role played by the gold 
standard in propagating the banking crises of the Great Depression. 
 
III. TRADE        
III.A How big was the trade collapse? 
  Between mid-1929 and mid-1932 the world witnessed an unprecedented peacetime 
decline in international trade.  Total exports as a percentage of GDP in a sample of 27  
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leading countries whose data underlie Figure 3 fell from 9.0 in 1929 to 5.0 in 1932.
4 Total 
real exports for these nations fell by just over 50% and GDP fell by 15% on average 
between the peak in 1929 and the trough of 1932.  These declines are comparable to those 
suffered during the recent trade collapse of 2008-09.  In the first year of both crashes, trade 
fell by roughly 20 percent.
5 In the recent trade bust and during the first year of the 
Depression the average GDP decline was four percent. Both trade busts also seem to have 
been highly synchronous across nations. Between 1929 and 1930, 85 percent of these 27 
nations had negative trade growth which is the same proportion reported by Baldwin 
(2009) for 2008-2009. 
During the 1930s the trade collapse continued for another two years whereas it 
appears that today, after only one year, world trade is rebounding strongly. Whatever 
barriers put the brakes on trade seem to have dissipated rapidly, allowing for a quick 
rebound. During the Depression a sequence of income declines, and tariff and competitive 
exchange rate devaluations seem to have dragged trade down in successive rounds. This is 
famously depicted in the contracting spiral of trade figure – one of the most reproduced 
figures in all of economics according to Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) – originally 
published in 1933 in Austria and then by the League of Nations Economic Survey. We 
return to a comparison between the two episodes below. 
                                                 
4 These countries are those used in the sample of Jacks, Meissner and Novy (2009a) and cover roughly 70% 
of global GDP. They include: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the 
Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and 
Uruguay. 
5 See for instance, Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2010). Their values for the “volume of world trade” during the 
1930s from the League of Nations imply only about a 13 percent drop in the year after the peak in world 
trade. The difference between our 20% decline and theirs could be due to the samples or method of deflation. 
League of Nations statistics do not report the method of deflation. Figure 2 uses the US CPI to deflate the 
dollar value of trade.  
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  A number of studies have highlighted the extent of disintegration of world trade 
during the Depression. That is, the amount by which trade declined beyond that warranted 
by autonomous income declines say due to increased barriers to trade. Assume as a 
benchmark that both imports and domestic sales depend on local incomes with a unit 
income elasticity. When international trade declines by more than consumption of domestic 
tradeables, it implies that there has been an increase in barriers to international transactions. 
If this not the case, domestic sales would decline one for one with goods shipped across 
borders. In this case, although trade has collapsed, integration per se between markets is 
left unaltered, if by integration we have in mind a measure of the barriers to international 
relative to domestic trade. 
 The above logic follows closely nearly all conventional international trade 
literature that relies on the ‘gravity’ model to explain bilateral trade flows (more on this 
below). Jacks, Meissner, and Novy (2009a) show that most trade models and their gravity 
equations give rise to a unique metric that implicitly measures all barriers to international 
trade in tariff equivalent terms. Essentially the gravity model tells us how far actual 
bilateral trade is from where the model predicts it would be in the absence of all 
international barriers to trade. This measure rose, on average, by 25 percent during 1929-
1933. In other words, after controlling for income losses, it was as if worldwide tariffs had 
uniformly risen by 25 percent.  Nevertheless, there was some variance in outcomes. In the 
US between 1929 and 1933, exports declined by almost 60 percent while GDP fell by 
roughly 30 percent. For the US, this implies the tariff equivalent measure of trade costs 
rose was 26 percent.  France and Germany saw declines in exports of 50 percent with falls 
in GDP of 15 percent. The tariff equivalent rise in trade costs implied by these figures is 
just under 20 percent.   
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  Hynes, Jacks, and O’Rourke (2009) take a different approach, employing price data 
from selected commodities to assess the extent of the disintegration of international 
markets.   Price gaps (i.e., the difference between the price in the exporting country and the 
price in the importing country presumably reflecting barriers to trade) on agricultural 
commodities stood 160 percent higher in 1933 than they were in the comparatively 
“normal” year of 1913 (Hynes, Jacks, and O’Rourke, 2009).  These rises imply an average 
70 percent increase in the costs of international trade in commodities.  The UK and its 
trading partners within the British Empire saw rises of 62 percent.  UK and non-empire 
pairs posted rises of 135 percent. Non-empire country pairs witnessed rises of 200 percent. 
The Depression put a large wedge between the prices paid for imports and the prices 
exporters received. 
  A slightly earlier literature focused on measuring the change in tariffs as a proxy for 
changes in trade costs. Smoot-Hawley doubled tariff rates on a range of US imports. Irwin 
(1998) calculates that in 1922 the average ad valorem tariff was 34.61% while after Smoot 
Hawley in 1930 it was 42.28%. This translates into a rise in the ad valorem equivalent of 
tariff rates of about 20%, or a rise in the relative price of imports of 4-6% (i.e., 
    
    
 ). Since 
many tariffs were specific, meaning that they were in terms of monetary units per physical 
unit, the rise in tariffs reflected the global deflation that began in 1929 and involved more 
than just active legislation to raise the ad valorem tariff. Due to these effects in the US, the 
ad valorem equivalent average tariff (tariff revenue divided by dutiable imports) rose from 
about 40 percent to 60 percent. Crucini and Khan (1996) found ad valorem tariff 
equivalents nearly tripled, from eight to 22 percent in other countries. Madsen (2001) 
reported a doubling of tariff revenues relative to total imports between 1929 and 1932 in a 
slightly larger sample of countries.   
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III. B What Caused the Trade Decline?   
How should we understand the decline in world international trade? According to 
conventional modern trade theories, in general equilibrium the two main factors driving 
international bilateral trade are terms related to output/income levels of both trade partners 
and the barriers to foreign trade.
6  Barriers to foreign trade, often referred to as ‘trade 
costs,’ consist of all the costs that make foreign goods relatively more expensive than 
domestic goods. They include, but are not limited to, tariffs, international shipping and 
insurance costs, exchange rate volatility, and the availability of trade credit (Anderson and 
van Wincoop, 2004).  Can the world trade collapse be understood simply as a by-product of 
declines in output/incomes?  Or was it the result of restrictive trade policies and other 
shocks to the barriers of trade?  If the latter, these policy shocks could have acted as key 
drivers of the global depression.  Yet another possibility is that a vicious cycle was at work, 
with causality running from income to trade, trade to trade barriers, trade barriers to trade, 
and trade back again to income. We explore the record on trade, incomes and trade barriers 
next. 
From the mid-1920s through 1929, exports grew by about 50 percent while 
production increased by roughly 25 percent (Figure 3).  Although some nations dismantled 
quantitative controls imposed during the war period, tariffs remained high compared to 
levels in 1913 (Findlay and O’Rourke, 2007).  However, exchange rate volatility decreased 
                                                 
6 It is not difficult to show that if a gravity model of trade governs bilateral international trade and domestic 
trade as well then these are the two factors that matter. Models that give rise to such a gravity equation 
include monopolistic competition with complete specialization of a range of goods by country with or without 
increasing returns and consumers with homothetic preferences and a love of variety; the Ricardian model of 
trade studied by Eaton and Kortum (2002), and models with heterogeneous firms and/or fixed costs to foreign 
market entry (e.g., Chaney, 2008).  Deardorff (1998) argues that in a Heckscher-Ohlin world with trade costs 
a similar model holds too.  
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with the re-establishment of the gold standard, thereby reducing uncertainty for agents 
involved in cross-border transactions.  The League of Nations (1931) cites an increased 
demand for industrial products and a re-organization of industry in Europe as providing 
further stimulus to cross-border trade.   
The trade boom had stalled by early 1929. The initial cause is likely to have been 
the tightening of US monetary policy. The rise in US interest rates led to sharper rises in 
interest rates in deficit nations as they attempted to retain capital to finance their current 
account deficits. Tightening abroad led to reduced demand for American imports and, 
indeed, US exports begin to decline from 1928.  This suggests that the primary impulse for 
the decline in world trade was a real interest rate shock which lowered worldwide demand 
(Eichengreen, 1992a).  
The next insult to international trade came with the enactment of the Smoot-Hawley 
tariff by the United States during the summer of 1930.  The impulse for the US tariff rise 
was mainly political, reflecting a massive logrolling coalition covering a large spectrum of 
domestic producers. It is incorrect to view Smoot-Hawley as a response to the global 
downturn. The idea of tariff revision was sponsored as early as 1928 by the Republican 
candidate Herbert Hoover during the presidential campaign (Irwin and Kroszner, 1996). 
Countries reacted to this dramatic rise in tariffs and the incipient depression with 
their own protectionist measures. Germany, Italy and France preemptively raised tariffs on 
agricultural goods prior to final approval of Smoot Hawley in 1930.  During 1931 roughly 
61 nations raised tariffs or imposed barriers in response to US policy (Jones, 1934).
7 
                                                 
7 Eichengreen and Irwin (2010) argue that Smoot Hawley itself had a relatively minor direct impact on 
Europe and on the domestic economy. Instead they view the policy as setting a tone for further tariff 
escalation in Europe. They also cite the financial crisis of 1931 in Europe and its economic impact as a 
principal cause of further tariff rises  
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Although Great Britain had been the world’s cheerleader for free trade since the 1840s, it 
soon responded with tariff hikes of its own. Because of its free trade heritage, internal 
political debate on the issue was intense in 1931, but free trade ultimately lost.   
Jones (1934) argues that failure of the First and Second International Conferences 
for Concerted Economic Action in 1930-31 meant that international cooperation could not 
stop the avalanche of protectionism.  Britain’s general election of 1931 resulted in a 
National Government that acted on the public’s desire to stem the increasing trade deficit 
and to stabilize sterling.  The Tariff Act of 1931 and the Import Duties Act of 1932 meant 
the loss of a major market for many important countries although members of the British 
Empire were exempted by the Ottawa Agreements, which were concluded in the summer 
of 1932.  In France, a quota system was implemented between 1930 and early 1931. 
Madsen (2001) reports that there were 50 such quotas in existence in 1931 and 1,100 by 
1932.  In Spain, the Wais tariff raised duties on US automobiles. Italy imposed duties on 
US autos and other goods as well. Canada responded fiercely to Smoot-Hawley by 
establishing retaliatory duties on agricultural items and enlarged British preference. There 
is no doubt that the rampant rise in protectionist measures between 1930 and 1933 dealt a 
major blow to world trade up to 1933.  
Retaliation against Smoot-Hawley was costly.  If countries discriminated against 
US goods, an extra duty was to be levied on their exports to the US.  Many countries raised 
tariffs across the board in response.  Moreover, Most Favored Nation clauses extending 
preference to US goods were not reciprocated, which led to the quick decline of such 
treaties.  With the enactment of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in 1934, the US tariff 
system began to make exceptions to high tariffs on a country by country basis and so 
invited a more positive worldwide response generating a revival of trade.  
  16
What else besides retaliation to US tariffs drove countries to raise tariffs in the 
1930s?  Foreman-Peck, Hughes-Hallet, and Ma (2000) argue that countries raising tariffs 
did so with three objectives in mind: to raise production levels to those of 1929; to increase 
prices to 1929 levels; and to restore trade balance.  Since the exchange rate and monetary 
policy mattered for these outcomes, tariff policy seems to be related more fundamentally to 
monetary and exchange rate policies.  Countries clinging to gold while others devalued 
gave themselves an overvalued exchange rate, thus widening their trade deficits.  And, in 
fact, nations with stronger exchange rates seem to have imposed larger increases in their 
tariffs, ceteris paribus (Eichengreen and Irwin, 2010).  France, which did not devalue until 
1936, underwent a doubling of tariffs (as measured by tariff revenue divided by imports) 
between 1928 and 1938.  The Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland posted similar 
increases and also devalued very late in the Depression. Meanwhile, countries that did 
devalue, such as Sweden, Denmark, and Canada, saw only slight rises or even declines in 
tariffs.  In the exchange control countries tariff changes fell between these two extremes.  
Nonetheless, Figure 2 in Eichengreen and Irwin (2010) reveals that Britain (early 
devaluation), Germany (leading exchange control country) and France (gold bloc stalwart) 
had the highest unconditional rises in tariffs. It would appear that other factors also 
mattered. 
Despite the focus on trade policy in the literature, other forms of trade barriers also 
arose.  The surge in the barriers highlighted in the studies cited above also seems to be 
attributable to non-tariff barriers, greater exchange rate volatility, rises in foreign shipping 
costs relative to domestic shipping, and a lack of international trade credit. The demise of 
the international gold standard raised exchange rate volatility and increased uncertainty in 
international transactions, while the relative costs of shipping goods on ocean-going tramp  
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shipping lines rose considerably from the mid-1920s (Estevadeordal, Frantz and Taylor, 
2003). Opinions differ on the importance of the latter since the real freight rate series 
presented in Shah Mohammed and Williamson (2004) do not show rises until the 1930s. 
Different samples, compositional issues and methods of deflating probably explain these 
factors. Jacks, Hynes and O’Rourke (2009) provide some preliminary evidence that trade 
credit dried up also contributing to more limited international trade.  
 
III.C Accounting for the Trade Decline: Trade costs versus Incomes 
 
Many would identify the sharp decline in international trade between 1929 and 
1933 with the US tariff hike of 1930 and the alleged retaliation by other nations. Most 
recent research however shows that income declines and trade barriers can explain the 
decline in trade. The answer to the question which mattered more appears to depend on the 
particular sample previous studies have worked with and their particular methodology. 
What do we know? 
Three main methodologies have been used to account for the trade collapse between 
1929 and 1933. Irwin (1998) and Madsen (2001) estimate aggregate import and export 
demand equations. Imports are a function of domestic income and relative prices, and 
exports are a function of foreign income and relative prices. Relative prices are affected by 
supply and demand conditions, tariffs, exchange rate movements and other trade costs. 
Crucini and Khan (1994) study a computable general equilibrium model and run simulated 
counterfactuals using their model. An accounting exercise, similar in spirit to Baier and 
Bergstrand (2001) and based on the gravity model of bilateral trade is employed by Jacks, 
Meissner and Novy (2009a).   
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Madsen (2001) estimates reduced form regression equations for aggregate exports 
and imports. Within his sample, which covers 17 countries between 1920 and 1938, trade 
barriers account for 41 percent of the drop in trade between 1929-1932 while income 
declines account for about 59 percent (figure 3, p. 865). Madsen argues tariffs could have 
led to declines in incomes of up to 2 percent.  If so, the role of tariffs is slightly higher. 
Also, Madsen argues that tariff policy reduced demand during the depression along 
inelastic supply curves. This led to deflation in the tradable sector which further raised the 
real rate of tariff protection since many tariffs were specific and not ad valorem.  In this 
case, Madsen suggests that the impact of tariffs was as important as the output decline in 
explaining the trade collapse. Irwin (1998) uses a similar partial equilibrium methodology 
for the United States between 1929 and 1932 where higher tariffs contributed to about 1/5 
of the 40 percent fall in imports. The majority of the 1/5 was due to higher specific duties 
arising from deflation and not new legislation in the infamous Smoot Hawley tariff bill. 
Crucini and Khan (1994) calibrate a general equilibrium model to study the relation 
between tariffs, imports and GDP. Their model assumes that foreign goods are used as 
inputs to production. In this case, Crucini and Khan find that in the US tariffs account for 
about 1/5 to 2/5 of the decline in imports.  
Jacks, Meissner, and Novy (2009a) calculate the relative role of trade frictions and 
output declines using a gravity model of trade and reach a different conclusion. This 
gravity model represents equilibrium bilateral trade levels in a general equilibrium model 
of production and trade. Consumers typically are assumed to have homothetic preferences 
(although this is not a necessary condition) and almost any plausible production structure 
can be used. This approach yields the following equilibrium equation for bilateral trade 
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                    1             .
8  
 
This shows that bilateral trade (the product of exports (x) from country i  to j and j to i) 
depends on the following two factors: the product of domestic absorption (     or GDP-
Exports) and a term for trade frictions that encompasses tariffs and non-tariff barriers, real 
international shipping costs, exchange rate volatility etc. In this equation      is the tariff 
equivalent of the costs of international trade relative to domestic trade for both county i and 
j and σ is the time-invariant and constant-across-all-countries elasticity of substitution 
between any two goods home or foreign.  
The gravity model suggests a unit elasticity on domestic absorption and point 
estimates of this elasticity by Jacks, Meissner and Novy (2009a) are near unity. In the  
sample of 27 countries and 130 unique country pairs mentioned above, the authors find that 
at the average declines in incomes account for 15 percent of the fall in trade and trade costs 
account for 93 percent of the fall. Multilateral forces (i.e. a term that accounts for third 
market effects -- in essence a “price deflator” for bilateral effects) acted to keep trade 
buoyant and trade would have been 0.133 log points lower had this factor not risen between 
1929-1933.
9 This could happen if tariffs or demand management policies had sufficiently 
                                                 
8 The steps to derive gravity are straightforward as Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) show. Demand for 
exports from country i to j depend on incomes in j and the prices of i’s goods relative to a consumer price 
index. Using market clearing, it is obvious that world sales for country i (i.e., total income) equal total 
exports- including domestic sales. Use this equation to solve for the domestic price for i , substitute back into 
the demand equation and note that bilateral exports are a positive function of income in i  and j (relative to 
world income), price indexes for each country (i.e., multilateral resistance terms) and a negative function of 
trade costs. To arrive at the above equation, which has eliminated the price index terms using the domestic 
gravity equation see Jacks, Meissner and Novy (2009a). 
9 Note that the product of the domestic absorptions (GDP minus exports), the theoretically preferred measures 
of size, is equal to          
      
      
 .  This product fell on average by only 0.09 log points while the product of 
bilateral trade fell on average by 1.41 log points. The remainder of the log point fall (93%) then has to be 
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stimulative effects and hence positive spillovers. To the extent that income and trade costs 
are related, there can be biases in the accounting procedure. Madsen (2002) argued that 
trade costs might have had a negative impact on incomes so that the share of trade costs 
would be understated. If, however, declining incomes led to higher tariffs and other trade 
barriers, and some evidence shows this to be the case, the role of trade costs may be 
overstated.  
 
III.D The Global Trade Slump and the Global Depression: Symptom, Cause or 
Vicious Circle? 
  Recent empirical contributions to the literature on the synchronization of business 
cycles suggest that a doubling of trade intensity would raise the bilateral correlation in 
output movements by roughly 0.06, relative to an average correlation of roughly 0.3  
(Frankel and Rose, 1998).  Greater trade integration in the 1930s would be expected to 
raise countries’ exposure to the large economic shocks from abroad.  Indeed the French 
depression is often characterized as emanating in part from a major loss of export markets.  
And Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) detected that the devaluations of the early 1930s were 
partially ‘beggar-thy-neighbor’ policies. 
One simple dynamic story that also fits the facts is that the rise in real interest rates 
in 1928-29 in the US led to a slowdown in capital exports from the US and a decline in US 
exports (Eichengreen, 1992a: 227-228). As capital flows ceased, commodity exporters 
liquidated stocks in an attempt to avoid debt default, then devalued in order to do the same. 
Their incomes plummeted as supply rode down an inelastic demand curve. Next, US 
                                                                                                                                                    
attributable to rises in trade costs assuming that these barriers are not related to incomes and absorption and 
that the elasticity of substitution is constant.  
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tariffs, imposed more for political than economic reasons, compounded the shock to 
incomes by reducing exports further.  Devaluations beginning in 1931 with sterling’s 
departure from gold also inspired tariff retaliation and more loss of foreign demand.  This 
decline in demand and expected future reduced demand for domestic tradables led to even 
larger drops in output due to the loss of foreign markets and the exit of producers.  In this 
story a vicious circle (i.e., a trade multiplier) is the main culprit in the sad story of the 
interwar trade bust and a contributor to the Great Depression.   
Some back of the envelop calculations suggest the potential for explaining the 
income losses due to trade declines. In the US, where exports fell by 60 percent between 
1929 and 1933, even a high trade multiplier of 3 would have decreased overall income only 
by 9 percent. The overall fall in income was 30 percent. The US had a comparatively small 
export share near 5 percent in 1929, but in other small open economies the trade collapse 
might have played a larger role. In Canada for instance, the export share of income was 17 
percent. An export multiplier of three and the fall in exports of 45 percent could have led to 
a 25 percent fall in GDP compared to a 30 percent actual decline.  
 Several  contributions  add  to our understanding of the microeconomic links between 
trade and the Depression.  Crucini and Khan (1996) and Irwin (1998) propose general 
equilibrium models of trade in crucial intermediate goods for US final production.  When 
the US raised tariffs on intermediates, crucial to the production process, the marginal 
productivity of the factors of production fell and incomes declined.  Both Irwin and Crucini 
and Khan suggest that the output losses from rising tariffs were very small relative to the 
30 percent drop in overall GDP with a maximal effect of -2%. Perri and Quadrini (2002) 
examine Italy-- a small open economy where output effects are likely to be larger--using a 
dynamic general equilibrium model.  Their key assumption is also that imports were key  
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complements to domestically produced factors of production.  Unlike the model studied in 
Irwin, where labor and capital are fully employed, their model allows for changes in 
utilization of such inputs. With higher tariffs in Italy, its exports became relatively more 
expensive, reducing demand abroad and ultimately shifting resources into the non-tradable 
sector or forcing lower employment of capital and labor partially due to sticky nominal 
wages.  Tariffs and sticky wages in their model explain roughly half to ¾ of the downturn 
in Italy in the 1930s. In the Irwin model for the US, wage rigidity does not raise the 
contribution of tariffs and trade losses to income losses since sectoral reallocation is so 
small and since the model does not allow for unemployment of resources. 
  More broadly, other authors have suggested important interactions between trade 
policy, monetary forces, and international capital markets.  Eichengreen (1989) argues that 
tariffs might have been beneficial to the extent that they were domestically reflationary. In 
this argument, tariffs helped avoid a rise in real wages due to sticky nominal wages and 
limited real increases in the value of debt. This result holds even after taking into account 
retaliation although there are some offsetting effects making the net effect unclear.   
Devaluations, long derided as competitive devaluations, were another means to 
protectionism and recovery, but they too had a variety of side-effects.  First and most 
obviously they led to expenditure-switching and thus a beggar-thy neighbor effect 
(Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985).   Second, the impact of associated monetary loosening 
might have been to stimulate the economy.  A positive spillover via lower international 
interest rates could have helped boost output abroad too. The positive effect of devaluation 
and monetary expansion would have been the largest when all nations did it 
simultaneously. The evidence from the academic literature to date suggests that  
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devaluations stimulated production and exports (Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985 and Campa, 
1990). 
One factor limiting the benefits of devaluation might have been foreign debt. 
Devaluations can be contractionary when debt is denominated in foreign currency or a 
fixed amount of gold- as indeed it was in the 1920s and 1930s (League of Nations 1931: 
219).  Whether devaluations are expansionary or contractionary in the presence of hard 
currency indexed debt depends theoretically on several factors such as the openness to 
trade, the level of capital market imperfections and overall indebtedness (Céspedes, Chang 
and Velasco, 2004). Of course, default was an option often taken but the output effects of 
such actions are unclear. To date, no study we are aware of has examined this important 
issue so this remains fertile ground for further research.  
Overall, the collapse of global trade seems to have been as much a symptom as an 
important cause in the global Great Depression.  The precise impact on incomes of falling 
trade seems to be sensitive to how trade patterns are modeled and how important trade was 
for a particular country. In the US, a large relatively closed economy the bulk of the 
evidence suggests that falling income and tariffs pushed trade down in equal proportions 
and that trade’s impact on income was small. In smaller open economies it appears that 
trade barriers might have played a bigger role than incomes in bringing trade down and 







IV. LESSONS FROM THE GREAT DEPRESSION  
IV.A Banking Crisis and Monetary Policy 
  
  The banking crises of the Great Depression, like many of their predecessors, 
originated with a boom-bust macroeconomic cycle.  This was particularly true in the 
United States, where the Roaring Twenties was followed by the Great Depression.  As the 
bust took hold, a contagion of fear led to large-scale short-term capital movements and  
currency and banking crises in many countries. 
  American macroeconomic policy makers during the early 2000s again seem to bear 
substantial responsibility for encouraging—through loose monetary, fiscal, and regulatory 
policies—the housing boom, excessive leverage, and, ultimately, the collapse of the sub-
prime bubble.  Troubles were further compounded by an ostensible lack of regulation of 
risk management procedures, which created the potential for contagion and financial panic 
within the ‘shadow’ banking system and a also regulatory system that allowed institutions 
to grow ‘too big to fail’ that ended in crisis (it should be added that the modern crisis has 
not spared banking systems composed of large, extensively branched, or highly 
concentrated banks).  The proliferation of new—and largely unregulated--financial 
derivatives allowed financial institutions all over the world to take part in the boom—and 
bust.    Responding to crisis during the Great Depression was difficult because of the 
absence of institutions with an explicit mandate to maintain financial stability.  Regulation 
and supervision, where it existed, was not especially effective.  Deposit insurance systems 
did not exist.  Lenders of last resort were too timid to halt crises at home and were wary of 
contributing to efforts to head them off abroad.  Inadequate regulation and supervision bear 
a large part of the blame for the financial crises associated with the Great Recession, much  
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as they did during the Great Depression.  Changes to the regulatory and supervisory 
framework will certainly be a major topic of discussion for politicians in the months and 
years ahead.   
  On the other hand, some lessons of the Great Depression have been learned:  policy 
makers’ responses to the recent crisis have been far more forthcoming than those of their 
predecessors.  Extraordinary actions by governments and central banks once the panic 
started arguably helped to avoid the total meltdown that occurred during the Great 
Depression.  Principal amongst these actions were concerted coordination and cooperation 
amongst monetary authorities in Japan, Europe and the US, expansionary monetary policy 
via orthodox and not-so-orthodox policies, and fiscal stimulus policies. 
  The structural reforms that followed the Great Depression consisted of a set of 
severe constraints on banks and other financial institutions--a sort of financial “lockdown” 
(Grossman, 2010).  This heavily regulated environment was extremely successful at 
preventing a recurrence of Depression-style financial crises.  For more than 25 years 
following the end of World War II, the industrialized world’s financial system was 
completely crisis-free!  Of course, the financial lockdown was not costless: financial 
system development was retarded during its duration.  The lockdown was eased during the 
wave of deregulation that began during the late 1960s and early 1970s.  Perhaps not 
surprisingly, this easing was followed by the reemergence of financial crises during the 
1970s and 1980s. 
  It is interesting to ask whether a return to a highly constrained financial system 
would eliminate future crises like that which began in 2007.  Although there has been 
some tightening of regulation (e.g., on new financial products and on proprietary trading, as 
well as more stringent capital requirements) given the modern consensus that liberalized  
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financial markets are desirable (James 2001: 208), a return to financial lockdown is 
unlikely.   Further, the globalization in financial markets and improvements in 
communications technology of the late 20
th century means that a lockdown could not be 
implemented without a coordinated international effort, which is demonstrably not 
forthcoming at the moment, or a complete shutdown of cross-border financial flows, which 
also seems to be a political non-starter.  Nonetheless, the crises of the Great Depression and 
the Great Recession provide some evidence that the lax regulatory structures of the 1920s 
and the 2000s contributed to the magnitude of the Depression and the recent crisis.. 
There is strong scholarly consensus that the gold standard contributed to the length 
and depth of the Great Depression by imposing a deflationary bias, locking in 
unsustainable imbalances, and tying the hands of monetary policy makers.  Similar 
concerns have been raised about the euro, especially given the recent situation among the 
PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain), where the economic and downturn, 
combined with fiscal mismanagement in some cases, has led to soaring budget deficits.  
Since the escudo, lira, punt, drachma, and peseta have been subsumed by the euro, 
countries cannot hope to run expansionary monetary policy on their own and benefit from 
lower interest rates and a depreciated exchange rate. 
  Does this mean that one of the lessons of the Great Depression is that abandoning 
the euro would help avoid further recession?  The economic consequences and legal basis 
for countries to exit from the euro has been examined (Eichengreen 2007a, Athanassiou 
2009) and, although such an exit may be feasible, it would likely be much more costly than 
abandonment of the gold standard was in the 1930s, with Eichengreen (2007b) suggesting 
that the breakup would trigger “the mother of all financial crises.”  Eichengreen (2010), 
Krugman (2010), and Gros and Mayer (2010) believe that the only way out is forward.   
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They argue that short-term assistance from wealthier Eurozone countries (e.g., Germany)—
with conditions attached—would  stabilize the PIIGS, allowing time for greater economic 
integration (e.g., labor market integration) and fiscal federalism to generate a more stable 
framework for Europe’s future.  Such short-term assistance was half-hearted, at best, 
during the Great Depression. Again, while policy makers have made advances in 
understanding the role of the exchange rate and monetary policy, the new economic 
environment has still proven challenging for economic policy makers. 
 
IV.B Lessons From Two Trade Busts 
  Loss of exports via trade linkages was a key factor in the internationalization of the 
Great Depression for many countries.  The global economy today is also characterized by 
extensive global trade linkages.  And indeed a trade collapse has accompanied the recent 
financial crisis and global recession. The reported fall in real exports in both busts in the 
first year of the downturn was on the order of 20 percent. Global output fell on average 
four percent in both periods. Today’s trade bust stands out from other recent recessions in 
that the trade collapse has been highly synchronized (Yi, 2009 and Baldwin, 2009). 
Similarly, in the first year of the Depression, 85 percent of countries, just like today, had 
negative export growth. There are many superficial commonalities between the two trade 
busts. 
The difference between then and now appears to be that trade has already started to 
rebound while it continued to spiral downwards for another two years during the Great 
Depression. In the 1930s, nations’ incomes fell and trade multipliers magnified the impact. 
Tit-for-tat commercial and exchange rate policy was not totally synchronized and led to a 
succession of beggar-thy-neighbor policies with highly negative outcomes.    
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The fact that trade dropped equally as quickly and evenly across nations in both 
busts does not mean that similar factors are to blame. Today it seems plausible that 
uncertainty and changes to the structure of trade are responsible for the decline. In the 
Depression, income declines, tariffs and other trade barriers mattered most as our review of 
the literature has highlighted. 
A rapidly expanding literature analyzing the recent trade collapse supports our  
conjecture regarding the recent collapse.
10 Some evidence exists that world trade has 
become more sensitive over time to output movements (Freund, 2009). One reason is that a 
significant share of trade amongst the largest economies consists of consumer durables and 
investment goods which are more volatile than total output (Engle and Wang, 2009). In 
moments of uncertainty, consumers and producers put such purchases on hold. 
International trade may therefore suffer disproportionately during recessions. Exporters of 
these goods such as Germany and Japan have seen some of the sharpest falls in exports 
which appears consistent with this observation. Today the share of such manufactures in 
world trade is close to 65% whereas in 1929 it was roughly 35%. If both trade collapses 
were due in part to a rise uncertainty then these statistics might imply the shock to 
confidence was greater in 1929. Indeed manufacturing trade seems to have fallen much 
more steeply than food and raw material trade in the Depression or today (Saint-Etienne, 
1984). Still, the consensus on the Depression is that trade barriers mattered more than 
uncertainty. The profound structural changes that have taken place in the last two decades 
                                                 
10 Chor and Manova (2010) study trade credit. Alessandria, Kaboski and Midrigan (2010) study the 
interaction between the credit crunch and inventories in US automobile imports. Levchenko, Lewis and Tesar 
(2009) focus on compositional issues and to a lesser extent vertical specialization. Jacks, Meissner and Novy 
(2009b) found evidence that trade fell faster relative to incomes when vertical specialization was more 
important. Eaton, Kortum, Neiman and Romalis (2010) allow for composition, demand shocks, and trade 
costs. They also find a role for the composition of trade arguing that the drop in demand for durables was 
much larger and these are heavily traded.  For a range of views see the chapters in Baldwin (2009).  
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in the international supply chain are also suspected to be a key difference. International 
production sharing or vertical specialization makes trade increasingly sensitive to changes 
in the costs of international trade (Yi, 2003). Intuitively, the more times a good crosses a 
border on its way to becoming a final good, the more border costs each good faces. Today, 
a small rise in all international trade costs could make such trade more costly and cut off a 
large number of cross-border transactions. These costs are broadly defined and include 
transportation costs, commercial policy variables, insurance costs, financing costs and a 
range of other frictions. Incipient protectionism highlighted by the Global Trade Alert and 
the drying up of trade credit (Chor and Manova, 2010) associated with the financial 
meltdown could have triggered a magnified fall in trade even if they imply seemingly small 
rises in the relative costs of trade. The latter explanation is appealing, since once trade 
credit conditions went back to normal, trade would be expected to snap back sharply as it 
seems to have done. The fact that trade is on a global rebound too makes the production 
sharing story an attractive part of the explanation for the recent trade collapse.  
The production sharing hypothesis also suggests a reason for the sharp and 
coordinated downturn and for an enhanced transmission of shocks. While there is evidence 
that trade enhances the co-movement of output and income shocks in both periods, today’s 
move to vertical specialization might be able to explain the greater synchronicity in the 
world trade shock (Di Giovanni and Levchenko 2010). Surprisingly, a “decoupling” 
argument made recently in the academic literature holds that nations’ business cycles are 
increasingly less synchronized.  Domestic demand from within large economies or regional 
demand (Eurozone, East Asia) is more important than broader linkages between emerging 
markets and industrialized nations (Kose, Otrok, and Prasad, 2008).  The global recession 
and trade decline of 2008-2009 would seem to provide evidence to the contrary.  Evidence  
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from the interwar period suggests that trade mattered in the Depression for output co-
movement (Foreman-Peck, Hughes Hallet, and Ma, 2000 and Mathy and Meissner, 2010), 
but the channel is likely to be quite different from that today.  
  Is it impossible to insulate an economy from international forces?  Although trade is 
still a major force for transmitting shocks, monetary policy in many countries is not as 
tightly bound to other nations as it was in 1929 and 1930 when the gold standard was still 
in operation, although the EMU is a notable exception. The evidence on whether of 
monetary policy and fixed exchange rates heightens co-movement today is mixed in any 
case in the recent period (compare Baxter and Kouparitsas, 2005, Clark and van Wincoop, 
2001, and Artis and Zhang, 1997).  Also, major advances in economics structure and 
economic policy have changed the landscape from the 1930s. Counter-cyclical fiscal policy 
and large shares of expenditure accounted for by national governments and the service 
sector is now a fact of life.  
Co-movement is still an issue, although it is unclear how bad it could have been in 
the absence of counter-cyclical fiscal policy that went into motion in 2008-09.  It is still 
unclear--and too early to know—to what extent monetary, fiscal and trade factors have 
mattered in the current downturn for co-movement. Significant gaps in our knowledge due 
to poor data on financial and trade linkages coupled with economic theories that lag behind 
the rapidly changing structure of international trade and finance plague the real-time 
assessment of these forces.  
  Two other significant factors that helped the global economy to avoid a 1930s- style 
trade collapse are floating exchange rates (within EMU issues notwithstanding) and the 
World Trade Organization. Floating exchange rates between Japan, Europe, and the United 
States have allowed for smoother adjustment and less reliance on an implicit exchange rate  
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guarantee for producers.  Moreover, less concern about exchange rate levels in the 
advanced economies have liberated monetary policy makers (the European Monetary 
Union is again an exception), allowing them to adopt simultaneous, if not fully 
coordinated, expansionary monetary policies.  If the gold standard ‘mentalité’ contributed 
to tariffs, then we clearly no longer have this problem.  
The World Trade Organization has demonstrated itself quite capable of imposing 
sanctions on protectionist policies: the WTO seems to work to stop global outbreaks of 
protectionism. Although the Global Trade Alert has focused on a number of acts of ‘murky 
protectionism’ there has been no return to near autarky levels of tariffs like that of the 
1930s.  Multilateralism has held strong on the trade front, especially for the EU, meaning 
tariff rise in a significant bloc of nations have been limited. 
In terms of the structure of production and consumption, the global economy has 
indeed changed radically.  The recent trade collapse seems to be due to uncertainty and 
small trade costs changes interacting with supply chains.
11 During the Depression, income 
losses, tariffs and other policy problems were most important in explaining the trade 
decline. Despite having learned how to impede successive rounds of tariff rises and keep 
income buoyant, today’s Great Recession has produced an almost equally impressive trade 
decline in its first year. The fact that trade is rebounding quickly is cause for optimism and 




                                                 
11 Eaton, Kortum, Neiman and Romalis (2010) using a methodology related to that used in Jacks, Meissner 
and Novy (2009a) suggest that the trade cost rise was much bigger during the Depression than it has been 
during the recent recession.  
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V. Final Thoughts: Learning from the Past, Keeping Up, and Looking Forward. 
 
In classes on the Great Depression our students frequently ask, as Minsky (1982) 
did: “Can ‘It’ Happen Again?”  Implicit in that question is whether ‘we’ (i.e., economists, 
policy makers, market participants, society) have learned anything.  It also provokes us to 
consider what sorts of new risks might set off another Great Depression.  
Economic history shows that policy makers do learn.  The United States responded 
to the crisis of 1907 by creating the National Monetary Commission, which conducted in-
depth historical and contemporary studies of the monetary and banking systems of the 
United States and other leading nations; many other countries have responded to financial 
crises with similar inquiries.  The end result for the US was the establishment of a central 
bank, now considered an indispensible player in promoting financial stability.  The 
financial havoc wreaked by the Great Depression led US policy makers to introduce a 
number of regulations and limits on markets in the wake of the Great Depression.  These 
seem to have had the effect of promoting financial stability although, admittedly, there 
were losers as well an winners.  International policy makers introduced the Bretton Woods 
institutions (i.e., IMF, World Bank and the GATT/WTO) in an effort to promote exchange 
rate stability, avoid disruptive speculation in the global capital markets and prevent a 
recurrence of the Depression’s decline into protectionism.  That effort has been largely 
successful on the latter front while somewhat less so on the first two.  It remains to be seen 
whether banking crises can be restrained as they were in the immediate post-World War II 
period or whether the recent response has ‘sown the seeds’ of the next crisis.  
Like the IMF, World Bank, and GATT/WTO, the institutions of the European 
Union were created to enhance international cooperation and the smooth functioning of the  
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world economic system.  Although recent events in Greece have cast a shadow on the 
internationalism exemplified by the EU and the European Monetary Union, it is undeniable 
that substantial progress towards international cooperation has been made during the half 
century or so since the signing of the Treaty of Rome.  Certainly, the repercussions of 
financial crises in the leading nations under globalization have made it clear to most 
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Table 1:  
Unemployment 
in industry 
(percent)                       
                       
Country Australia  Belgium  Canada  Denmark  France  Germany Netherlands Norway Sweden UK US  
Year                      
1920  5.5   4.6  6.1   3.8  5.8  2.3  5.4  3.2  8.6  
1921  10.4  9.7  8.9  19.7  5.0  2.8  9.0  17.7  26.6 17.0 19.5  
1922  8.5  3.1  7.1  19.3  2.0  1.5  11.0  17.1  22.9 14.3 11.4  
1923 6.2  1.0  4.9  12.7  2.0  10.2 11.2  10.7  12.5  11.7  4.1   
1924 7.8  1.0  7.1  10.7  3.0  13.1  8.8  8.5  10.1  10.3  8.3   
1925 7.8  1.5  7.0  14.7  3.0  6.8  8.1  13.2  11.0  11.3  5.4   
1926 6.3  1.4  4.7  20.7  3.0  18.0  7.3  24.3  12.2  12.5  2.9   
1927  6.2  1.8  2.9  22.5  11.0  8.8  7.5  25.4  12.0 9.7 5.4   
1928 10.0  0.9  2.6  18.5  4.0 8.6  5.6  19.2  10.6  10.8  6.9   
1929 10.2  1.3  4.2  15.5  1.0  13.3  2.9  15.4  10.2  10.4  5.3   
1930  18.4  3.6  12.9  13.7  2.0  22.7  7.8  16.6  11.9 16.1 14.2  
1931  26.5  10.9  17.4  17.9  6.5  34.3  14.8  22.3  16.8 21.3 25.2  
1932 28.1  19.0  26.0  31.7  15.4  43.8  25.3  30.8  22.4 22.1 36.3  
1933 24.2  16.9  26.6  28.8  14.1  36.2  26.9  33.4  23.2 19.9 37.6  
1934 19.6  18.9  20.6  22.2  13.8  20.5  28.0  30.7  18.0 16.7 32.6  
1935 15.6  17.8  19.1  19.7  14.5  16.2  31.7  25.3  15.0 15.5 30.2  
1936 11.3  13.5  16.7  19.3  10.4  12.0  32.7  18.8  12.7 13.1 25.4  
1937  7.4  11.5  12.5  21.9  7.4  6.9  26.9  20.0  10.8 10.8 21.3  
1938  7.8  14.0  15.1  21.5  7.8  3.2  25.0  22.0  10.9 12.9 27.9  
1939  8.8  15.9  14.1  18.4  8.1  0.9  19.9  18.3  9.2 10.5 25.2  
                       
Eichengreen and Hatton (1988: 6-7). 
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Table 2: Banking crises during the Great Depression 
 
Crisis countries: Austria, Belgium, Estonia. Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Norway, Poland, Romania, Switzerland, United States, Yugoslavia. 
 
Non-crisis countries: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Greece, Japan, Lithuania, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
 
 
Source: Grossman (2010: 314-6). 
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Source: Maddison (2009).  
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Figure 2: Exchange rates and industrial production, 1935 
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Notes: Total exports in real 1990 US Dollars for 27 countries are divided by real GDP in US dollars for the same set of countries. The countries included are: 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, the Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay. Data for GDP are from Maddison 
(2003). Exports data come from various sources cited in Jacks, Meissner, and Novy (2009a).  
 